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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines several issues related to the introduction and trading of 
stock index futures contracts in Malaysia.  Issues related to volatility, pricing efficiency, 
systematic patterns and lead-lag relationships are examined.  These issues were studied 
by way of addressing six research questions.  We use two data sets.  First, daily price 
data for 4 years and 2 years respectively for stock and futures markets and second, 
intraday, 15 minute interval data for 43 days (2 months) of futures trading. 
 
 
Based on our results, we find no evidence of any increase in the volatility of the 
underlying market following futures introduction.  If anything, the one year period 
following  futures introduction had lower volatility.  Intermarket comparison showed 
futures volatility to be higher.  No evidence of any expiration day effect was found.  We 
find frequent mispricing, with most of it being underpricing.  Including transaction costs 
showed very little mispricing.  Analysis of the 15 minute intraday data showed clear 
evidence of an overall U-shape in futures volume and volatility.  However, a minor third 
peak at reopening following lunch break was also evident.  We find no evidence of a 
lead-lag relationship, rather a contemporaneous one.  Both markets appear to react 
simultaneously to information arrival. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 This paper examines several market microstructure issues related to the 
introduction and trading of stock index futures contracts in Malaysia.  The regulatory 
stance preceeding the introduction of financial derivatives, had clearly been a hesitant 
one.  This is not surprising given that derivatives were being blamed for stock market 
crashes and the huge losses incurred in fiascoes such as the Procter & Gamble, Orange 
County, Metallgeselschaft and Barings PLC.  That the Barings collapse happened in 
Malaysia's neighbour,  Singapore, right around when regulators were considering a 
private initiative to establish the country's first financial derivatives exchange did not help 
matters.   Following tentative steps,1 the government allowed the introduction of an index 
futures contract to be based on the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI).  Designated 
as FKLI, the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index Futures contract began trading on the 
country's first financial derivatives exchange, The Kuala Lumpur Options & Financial 
Futures Exchange (KLOFFE) in mid-December 1995.  With the introduction, Malaysia 
was probably Asia's only truly emerging market with a financial futures contract.  Thus 
far, experience with financial derivatives has been mixed at best.  While the stock index 
futures contract has been relatively successful with volume averaging close to 2000 
contracts per day,2  an interest rate futures contract introduced in mid 1996  by yet 
another newly established exchange3 has remained still born. 
 
 
                                               
1
 A Government commissioned World Bank study in the early 1990s had recommended against the 
introduction of derivatives as the capital market was not deemed sufficiently developed. 
 
2Daily volume saw a drastic fall in the immediate period following the imposition of Capital controls on 1st 
Sept. 1998. 
 
3The Malaysian Monetary Exchange (MME). 
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 The Malaysian stock index futures contract has as its underlying, the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index (KLCI).  The KLCI which is the most widely 
quoted index is a capitalization weighted index of 100 stocks listed on the main board.  
Chart 1 in Appendix outlines some of the key features of the futures contract's 
specifications.  For economic reasons, the two derivative exchanges, KLOFFE and MME 
share a single clearinghouse.  The trading system on KLOFFE is entirely screen based 
with electronic matching.  Regulation of all cash settled derivative products come under 
the purview of the Futures Industry Act (FIA).  The FIA was the result of major regulatory 
reform in 1993 to pave the way for introduction of cash settled derivatives.  Though the 
Ministry of Finance is the ultimate regulatory authority, it has delegated all FIA 
enforcement to the Securities Commission. 
 
MOTIVATION & RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Though there have been numerous studies on developed country futures 
markets, there have been few in-depth studies of such markets in emerging countries 
such as Malaysia.  We are unaware of any published study of a comprehensive nature 
on the KLCI futures contract.  Our objective is to examine the several issues related to 
the introduction and trading of stock index futures contracts.  Aside from the need to 
understand these issues for future policy making, it will be interesting to examine the 
impact of index futures introduction in a market at a lower stage of development, with 
incomplete markets and tight short selling regulation.4    
 
 
                                               
4Current Regulation prevents short selling of stocks.  Though a select number of stocks have recently been 
designated for securities borrowing and lending, the cumbersome process has meant little stock lending 
activity. 
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 Given the objective of a comprehensive examination, this paper studies four 
broad areas related to index futures.  The four areas being (a) issues related to volatility. 
(b) pricing efficiency, (c)  systematic patterns in volatility and trading activity and (d) lead-
lag relationships. 
 
 In doing this, we use two data sets.  First, a set of daily data and second, a set of 
intraday transaction data based on 15 minute time intervals.  In order to examine the 
four broad areas, we address a total of six main research questions.  These research 
questions are as follows: 
(1) What is the impact of futures introduction on underlying market volatility? 
 
(2) How does the futures market volatility compare to stock market volatility? 
 
(3) Is there any evidence of an expiration day effect on the underlying stock market? 
 
(4) What is the extent of mispricing on the KLCI futures? 
 
(5) Is there evidence of systematic patterns in intraday volatility and trading patterns in 
the futures market? 
 
and 
 
(6) Do the returns and volatility  in the two markets exhibit any lead-lag relationship? 
 
Though the above six questions constitute the main theme of this paper, we also 
analyze a number of minor issues/questions that may be related to these main research 
questions.     This paper is organized as follows; Section 2 below, provides an overview 
of the existing literature related to our research questions.  Section 3, describes our data 
and research methodology.   Section 4, provides the results and analysis. The final 
section, Section 5 concludes. 
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Section 2:  Literature Review 
 This section provides an overview of existing literature relevant to our research 
questions.  This review of previous work is organized  sequentially in the order of the 
above mentioned six questions. 
 
2.1 :  Impact of Futures Introduction on Underlying Stock Market Volatility. 
 The impact of index futures introduction on underlying stock market volatility is 
well researched and documented; especially in the case of the US, UK, Japan and Hong 
Kong.   Most of the studies find little or no evidence of increased stock market volatility 
following futures introduction.  In the most recent of such studies, Pericli and Koutman 
(1997) examine S&P 500 returns over the period 1953 to September 1994.  They find no 
incremental effect on underlying market volatility as a result of the introduction of index 
futures nor of options.  This results appear to confirm the findings of Santori (1987)  who 
used daily and weekly returns for S&P 500 over a 10 year period.  Miller and Galloway 
(1997),  examine the Mid Cap 400 index for evidence of volatility change following the 
introduction of a futures contract on the index.  They find no evidence of any increased 
volatility, if anything, their results point to a  possible reduction  in underlying volatility. 
  
 Earlier studies on other US indices point to similar results.   Choi and 
Subramaniam (1994) found no significant effect on returns volatility on the MMI following 
the introduction of an MMI futures contract.  Edwards (1988a, 1988b) using daily data 
over a 15 year period, 1972 - 1987 for both the S&P 500 and the Value Line composite 
Index (VLCI),5  examines volatility change following futures introduction on the 
respective indices.   
                                               
5The VLCI is a geometrically weighted index. 
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Again, he too found no evidence of increased underlying market volatility following 
futures introduction.  However, in contrast to these findings, Lockwood & Linn (1990) 
using daily intraday open-to-close returns for the DJIA over the 1964 - 1989 period, find 
higher volatility of the DJIA following introduction of VLCI futures contracts.  
 
Studies on non US indices appear to point to similar results, Freris (1990) finds 
no volatility increase on Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index when futures contracts were 
introduced.  Hogson & Nicholls (1991), examine the Australian All Ordinaries Index for 
the six year period surrounding futures introduction in 1983.  They conclude that futures 
introduction had no impact on stock market volatility.  In a multi-country study on futures 
introduction,  Lee and Ohk (1992) examine daily return data for 2 years before and after 
the introduction of futures contracts in Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, the US  and UK.  
The authors find no change in volatility in Australia and a decrease in volatility in Hong 
Kong, thereby confirming the results of Freris (1990) and Hogson and Nicholls (1991).   
They found evidence of increased volatility in Japan's Nikkei Index for the 2 years 
following futures introduction on SIMEX.6   Evidence on the US and UK were mixed.7  In 
yet another multi-country study but for the same futures contract, Bacha and Villa (1993) 
examined the impact of Nikkei futures introduction in Singapore (SIMEX), Osaka (OSE) 
and Chicago (CME) based on the Nikkei Stock Index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.8  
They found increased volatility following the contract's first  introduction on SIMEX, a 
reduction in volatility following the Osaka introduction and no change with CME listing.9 
                                               
 
6
 Singapore International Monetary Exchange.  The first futures contract on a Japanese Index was 
introduced on SIMEX. 
 
7
 Volatility was found to be higher when different subperiods were used. 
 
8
 The Nikkei futures contract was introduced on SIMEX in 1986, on OSE in 1988 and on the CME in 1990. 
 
9There is a 15 hour time difference between Tokyo and Chicago, thus there is no contemporaneous trading. 
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2.2:  Relative Volatility 
 The volatility of futures contracts relative to the underlying stock market has been 
of major interest to researchers since the inception of futures contracts in 1982.  Chu 
and Bubnys (1990) examine relative volatility using the natural logarithm of daily closing 
prices for the S&P 500 and the NYSE.  For the six year period of their study ; 1982 to 88,  
they find futures volatility to be higher.  A similar finding is made for a longer 10 year 
period by Koutmas and Tucker (1996).  Using the Augmented - Dickey Fuller and the 
Engle Granger statistics, the authors also find that the volatility in both the futures and 
stock markets are highly persistent, are predictable on the basis of past innovation and 
have remarkably stable correlations.  Yadav and Pope (1990) use volatility measured 
using the natural logarithm of daily close-to-close and open-to-open prices and the 
Parkinson Extreme Value Estimator to compare FTSE 100 index and futures volatility.  
They find futures volatility to be higher.  A similar finding is made by Yau, Scheeweis and 
Yung (1990) for Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index and its futures contracts. 
 
 Studies on the Japanese index and its futures contracts has yielded interesting 
results.  Brenner, Subramanyam and Uno (1990) examine daily closing prices of the 
Nikkei Futures contract traded on SIMEX and Osaka and compare it to the TOPIX index 
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  They find higher futures volatility.  Bacha and Villa (1993) 
use volatility measures similar to that of Yadav and Pope (1990) to compare volatility of 
the Nikkei Futures traded on SIMEX, Osaka and the CME with the Nikkei Stock Index.  
They found the volatility of the underlying Nikkei Stock index to be marginally higher than 
the futures contracts traded in Osaka but no different from that of SIMEX.  The authors 
argue that this may be due to the much tighter regulatory framework on the OSE relative 
to SIMEX.  These results appear to be confirmed by Choudry (1997) who studies short-
run relative volatility on the Hang Seng,  the Australian All Ordinaries and the Nikkei.  
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With the exception of the Nikkei, the other futures contracts were found to be more 
volatile than their underlying markets. 
 
2.3:  Futures Expiration Day Effect 
 Evidence of an expiration day effect on underlying market volatility appears 
mixed.  Where an effect has been found, it appears mostly temporary and small in 
magnitude.  Several studies have examined triple witching days in the US market.  
While, Stoll and Whaley (1987) and Edwards (1988) find no evidence of increased stock 
market volatility on futures expiration days,   Feinstein and Goetzmann (1988), using a 
non-parametric test present evidence of extreme price movements on triple witching 
days.  These results are supported by Hancock (1991) who finds an expiration day effect 
for the S&P 500. 
 
 Karakullukcu (1992) finds no expiration day impact on FTSE 100.  This he 
argues, could be because the FTSE futures contracts' settlement prices are calculated 
based on mid morning rather than closing prices.  Bacha and Villa (1993) arrive at 
similar results for the Nikkei stock and futures contracts.  They find no evidence of an 
expiration day effect on the underlying Nikkei Index in Tokyo.  They point out that these 
could be due to the staggered expiration dates and the use of different final settlement 
prices. 
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2.4:  Evidence On Mispricing 
 A futures contract would be mispriced if its price deviates from its fair value 
adjusted for net carrying costs.  The existence of index arbitrage should keep these 
deviations to a minimum.  However, many studies have found significant arbitrage 
opportunities, especially in the early years of a contract.  When adjusted for transaction 
costs, much of the mispricing appears to diminish.  Still, the evidence of existing 
mispricing appears to be largely due to the presence  of institutional barriers, uptick 
rules, restrictions on arbitrage activity, stale prices and execution risk or simply due to 
institutional inertia resulting from inexperienced traders, insufficient volume or an 
inadequate supply of arbitrage capital .10   Studies on index futures traded in the US by 
Bhatt and Cakici (1990), Morse (1988), Billingsley and Change (1988) find deviations 
from fair-values that were sufficiently large, that  transaction costs alone  would not be 
sufficient to explain the deviations. 
 
 Studies on the S&P 500 that included transaction costs, such as those by Kipnis 
and Tsang (1984) and Arditti, Ayaydin, Mattu and Rigsbee (1986) found considerable 
mispricing.   Though both over and underpricing were evident, there appeared to be a 
greater tendency for underpricing.  This underpricing was particularly in evidence in the 
initial period of a contract.  Though the inclusion of transaction costs creates a no-
arbitrage bound resulting in less net mispricing, Klemkosky and Lee (1991) who also 
include indirect costs such marking to market and future taxes, found mispricing in about 
5% of the sample.  
 
 
                                               
10
 See: Charles M.S. Sutcliffe, (1992), Chapman & Hall Publishing. 
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 In the non US studies, Yadav and Pope (1990) find proportionate11 underpricing 
for the FTSE 100.  The mispricing however, reduces as the contract approaches 
maturity.  A strong first order correlation in mispricing was also found.  Yau, Scheewis 
and Yun (1990), in examining the Hang Seng index futures find futures to be overpriced 
even after adjusting for transaction costs in the period preceeding the 1987 crash.  In the 
post-crash period,  they found little mispricing. 
 
Brenner, Subramanyam and Uno (1989b, 1990a) find significant underpricing for 
the Nikkei Stock Index futures over the 2 year period of their study 1986 - 1988.  In 
approximately 42% of the observations, underpricing was found in excess of estimated 
transaction costs.  The size of the underpricing  however declined over time.  A strong 
first order correlation in mispricing was found.  Bacha and Villa (1993) replicated the 
Brenner et al study, but over a longer time period to include the Nikkei futures traded in 
Osaka and Simex12.  Dividing their study into 3 subperiods, they find underpricing in the 
first subperiod, little mispricing in period 2 and near consistent overpricing in  subperiod 
3.  The authors argue that this mispricing changes had to do with regulatory change in 
Japan.  Brenner et al (1989b, 1990a) also point to regulatory relaxation in late 1989 for 
the reduction in underpricing noted in their results. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11
 Proportionate mispricing refers to mispricing as a % of current index price. 
 
12Brenner et. Al (1989b, 1990a) only examine the first two year when SIMEX alone had the Nikkei Futures 
contract. 
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2.5:  Patterns In Intraday Trading and Volatility  
 Analysis of timed interval intraday transactions data of stocks have shown 
systematic patterns in returns, trading volume and volatility.  Typically, intraday volume 
and  volatility have portrayed U-shaped patterns.13  A number of researchers have 
presented evidence that these patterns exist in futures markets too.  Among the early 
researchers were Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1990), Froot, Gammill and Perold (1990) 
and Cheung and Ng (1990).  The latter two studies used 15 minute interval transactions 
data for the S&P 500 futures.  Chan, Chan and Karolyi (1991), using five minute returns 
over a 5 year period of the S&P 500 futures find a U-shaped pattern within each day.  
Similar findings were made by Ekman (1992).  The volatility of 15 minute logarithmic 
returns followed a U-shaped pattern within each day.  Transaction volume showed a 
similar pattern. 
 
 In the most recent such study, Daigler (1997) examined the behaviour of S&P 
500, MMI and T-bond futures over 15 minute and 5 minute intervals.  Using standard 
deviation, number of ticks and the Garman-Klass volatility measure as measures for 
volatility, he reports the following findings; (I) volatility and trading activity display the 
basic U-shaped pattern (II) index futures volatility peaks at NYSE open (III) at end of 
day, the most volatile interval for index futures is not at NYSE close but approximately 
30 minutes before NYSE close (IV) the results show little difference between the 
intraday patterns using the standard deviation or the Garman-Klass measure. 
 
 
 
                                               
13See:  Chang, Kang and Rhee (1993) for a detailed analysis of the Malaysian Stock Market. 
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2.6:  Lead-lag Relationships In Returns And Volatility 
 Several previous studies, particularly of US markets have documented evidence 
of a lead-lag relationship between the futures and stock markets.  Several reasons have 
been put  forth to explain this relationship.  Among these are (I) infrequent trading of 
stocks comprising the index; therefore the index reflects "stale" prices and so lags 
futures (II) differences in liquidity between the stock and futures markets, (III) informed 
traders may have a preference to trade in one market and not the other depending on 
whether the information is firm specific or systematic and (IV) due to market frictions 
such as transaction costs, capital requirements and short-selling restrictions that may 
make it more optimal to trade in the futures markets. 
 
 Ng (1987) tests for Granger causality between futures and underlying market 
returns for different underlying assets such as currencies, commodities and indices.  The 
results suggest that futures prices generally lead spot prices.  Kawaller, Koch and Koch 
(1987) using transaction data for a two year period, find that though the S&P 500 index 
and futures prices are highly correlated,   futures leads the index by approximately 20 - 
45 minutes.  A similar result, although with a much smaller lead time was found14 by 
Herbst, McCormack and West (1987) for the S&P 500.  These results were further 
confirmed by Chan, Chan and Karolyi (1991), who,  using five minute interval returns 
and a bivariate GARCH model found that futures lead spot by about 5 minutes.  Stoll 
and Whalley (1990b) using 5 minute returns for a five year period and an ARMA model 
find that the S&P 500 and MMI futures lead their cash indices by about 5 minutes. 
 
 
                                               
14The lead was between zero to eight minutes with an average of 0.7 minutes. 
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 Interestingly  this lead was not discernible in the Japanese markets.  Lim (1992a 
and 1992b) examined the Nikkei futures traded on SIMEX and the underlying index in 
Tokyo over 5 minute intervals.15  Based on his 20 day sample, he found no evidence of a 
lead-lag relationship.  He argues that this may be due to the insignificant volume on 
SIMEX relative to the futures and cash market volume in Japan. 
 
 While the above studies provide evidence of a lead-lag relationship in returns, 
studies examining a lead-lag relationship in price volatility have found mixed results.  
While Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1990) find no systematic pattern in the S&P 500 for the 
1984 - 86 period, Cheung and Ng (1990) find that the volatility of  S&P 500 futures prices 
led that of the spot by 15 minutes.  This latter study had adjusted for stale prices and 
GARCH effects.  Chan, Chan and Karolyi (1991) find evidence of strong inter market 
linkages in volatility. 
 
 Based on these studies, it appears that while a lead-lag relationship in returns 
can be established there is weak evidence in the case of volatility.  The volatility 
relationship  appears to be much more time variant. 
 
SECTION 3:  DATA & METHODOLOGY 
3.1:  Description of Data 
 Daily price data of the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) for the 4 year 
period, January 1994 to end December 1997 is used.16   These were daily high, low, 
                                               
15The Simex contract trades Simex Futures  contemporaneously though Tokyo is one hour ahead of 
Singapore.  
 
16The Composition of the KLCI was changed in on 15th April 1995.  Index composition increased from 86 
stocks to 100.  We reconstructed the index for the preceeding period using weights (capitalisation) as of that 
date. 
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open and close prices.   Similarly, daily high, low, open and close prices for the KLCI 
futures contract for the two year period, 15th December 1995 to end December 1997 is 
used.  For interest rates, we use daily quotations  of the 3 month KLIBOR  rate17.  
Dividend payment data (absolute Ringgit amounts) and payment dates for the two year 
period December 95 to December 97 were sourced from various issues of Investors 
Digest.  The daily price and interest rate data were from Datastream. 
 
 Our fifth and sixth research questions required daily intraday data.  Intraday data 
at 15 minute intervals is used for 2 different months, July and October 1998,18   a total of 
43 days.  These were sourced from Bloomberg.  The data set contains the time of 
transaction and the price for every futures transaction as well as the KLCI index  level 
computed by Bloomberg every minute.  Since, unlike the stock index, the futures price 
series is not uniformly spaced in time, the intraday price series were partitioned into 15 
minute intervals.  Based on these partitions, open, high, low and 'close' prices, volume 
and number of ticks for each 15 minute interval was  determined.  The entire data set 
consists of 1, 118 discrete intervals19 consisting of 26, 15 minute intervals for each 
trading day. 
 
3.2:  Methodology 
 For ease of clarity, the description of our methodologies is arranged sequentially 
according to the earlier stated order of our six research question.  In all cases, we study 
                                               
17The Kuala Lumpur Interbank offer rate. 
 
18Though these does not overlap with the earlier data set intraday data until mid 1998 was simply not 
available. 
 
1926 intervals x 43 days 
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only spot month contracts due to insufficient trading volume for distant contracts.20  We 
use relatively standard methodologies/measures that have been used previously. 
 
In addressing the first three questions which require volatility measures, we use 
three measures of volatility.  Following Bacha and Villa (1993), we define the logarithmic 
return of daily closing prices as; 
In(Ct / C t - 1) 
Where Ct is the closing price on day t.  The variance of this return series is used as the 
measure of intraday volatility.  The volatility second measure used is the Parkinson 
extreme value estimator.  This is computed as the natural logarithm of the day's highest 
and lowest prices; 
In(Ht / L t) 
The mean of this return series is used as our measure of trading period or intraday 
volatility. 
 
Following Garman and Klass (1980), whose work further refined the Parkinson extreme 
value estimator to include additional information (the closing prices), for a statistically 
superior measure of volatility, we use the Garman - Klass Volatility (GKV) measure 
where necessary.21  
This third measure is computed as; 
Var (GK)  = ½ [In (H t) - In (L t]2 - [2 In(2) - 1]  
  [In (O t) - In (C t)]2 
                                               
20We track a contract beginning the last 10 trading days (2 weeks) of the previous month and until the day 
before its expiration.  Thus, each spot month contract would be tracked for approx.  30 trading days  
Excluding the overlaps, our total sample period of futures is 506 trading days. 
 
 
21Wiggins (1992) finds that both the Parkinson and GKV measures show little downward bias and are much 
more efficient than the close-to-close volatility measure. 
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Where, H t,  L t, O t,  and  C t   are day t's high, low, open and close prices. 
In examining the impact of futures introduction on underlying market volatility, we 
compare the average of the daily volatility before and after futures introduction.  In 
addition to the overall period, we examine a ± 30 and ± 60 day window surrounding 
KLCI futures introduction on 15th December 1995.  The question of relative volatility in 
the stock and futures markets is determined by comparing the volatility measures on a 
contemporaneous basis.  We determine statistical significance using two test statistics.  
These are the F-ratio (parametric) and the non-parametric Wilcoxon - Z statistic. 
 
 To test for the existence of an expiration day effect, we use Feinstein and 
Goetzmann's (1988) non-parametric median test.  Using all non-expiration days in our 
sample, the median and interquartile ranges of stock market volatility is determined 
using our first two volatility measures.  Next, the volatility measures for expiration days is 
determined.  Since by construction half of the non expiration days should fall within the 
interquartile range and half outside, we want to see if the expiration days deviate from 
this pattern.  As in Feinstein and Goetzman (1988), we use the cumulative binomial 
distribution to test the likelihood that expiration day volatility is different from that of non-
expiration days. 
 
 In addressing the fourth research question; i.e. the extent of mispricing on the 
KLCI futures; we compute mispricing, Mt, as the difference between the theoretical and 
actual prices divided by the theoretical price. 
Mt   =  (Ft - Ft* ) Ft* 
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Where; Ft is the actual or observed futures price on day t.    Ft*  is the theoretical price or 
fair value.   Ft*  is computed using the standard cost of carry model  on an annualized 
basis as ; 
Ft*  = St* (1 + r-d) t,T 
Where St is the price of the stock index on day t, r is the 3 month annualized KLIBOR 
rate on day t, d is the annualized dividend yield22  and t,T is the time remaining to 
maturity: (T - t) 360. 
We carry out 2 sets of mispricing analysis; with and without transaction costs.  In order 
to include transaction costs,23  we define C+  as the cost of a cash and carry strategy and 
C- as cost of a reverse cash and carry.   We estimate a higher cost for a reverse cash 
and carry transaction and so add an additional 0.10% to C+  to arrive at C-.  Using these 
notations, we define the upper and lower bounds of the no-arbitrage bounds as follows:- 
F +t   = S t (1 + C + ) (1 + r - d) Tt ,  
F −t   = S t (1 + C − ) (1 + r - d) Tt ,  
Using these bounds, we compute  mispricing  inclusive of transaction cost as m t : 
   m t   = F t - F
t
t     if  F t  >  F
t
t  
      F tt  
          =  0  if   F −t  ≤ F t  ≤ F
t
t  
          =  F t - F
t
t     if  F t  <  F
−
t  
      F tt  
                                               
22the daily dividend yield is computed as 

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−
n
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1
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23Transaction costs are estimated for a typical RM10 million transaction.  While the commissions are straight 
forward listed amounts, the bid-ask spreads were estimates made by discussions with brokers. 
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 Our last two research questions are addressed using the 15 minute interval data.  
In examining for evidence of systematic patterns in intraday futures volatility and volume,  
we use the earlier mentioned 15 minute data.  In measuring volatility, all three of the 
above-mentioned volatility measures, standard deviation, the Parkinson Extreme value 
estimator and Garman-Klass (GKV) measures are used.  The only difference here being 
that the measures are based on each of the 15 minute partitions.  The intervals begin at 
9.00 am when both the futures and stock market begin trading and ends at 5.15 pm 
when the futures market closes.  The stock market has two trading sessions; from 9.00 
am to 12.30 pm and 2.30 - 5.00 pm.  The futures market on the other hand, has trading 
sessions from 9.00 to 12.45 pm and 2.30 - 5.15 pm.  Thus there are two 15 minute 
intervals; 12.30 - 12.45 pm and 5.00 - 5.15 pm when only the futures market is trading.  
These two intervals are therefore of special interest. 
 
 The mean values for each of these volatility measures for each 15 minute interval 
across all 43 days is determined.  We then plot these mean values to check  for 
evidence of a U-shaped pattern.  Additionally, we also test for statistical differences 
among intervals of interest based on the plots. 
 
 In seeking evidence of patterns in trading activity, we use two measures for each 
of the 15 minute intervals.  These are volume traded and the number of ticks.  Previous 
studies appear to point at the number of ticks as being a better indicator of trading 
activity.  Harris (1987) shows that the number of ticks for stocks are highly correlated 
with volume for the NYSE.  Additionally, Karpoff (1986) and Varian (1989) also note that 
for given a time interval, the number of ticks is superior to volume as a measure of 
information arrival.    Again, the mean volume and number of ticks for each interval 
across the 43 days is determined, plotted and select intervals tested for significance. 
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 Our final research question involves examining the returns and volatility in the 
stock and futures markets for evidence of a lead-lag relationship.  We do these by use of 
cross correlations and regression analysis.  First, using the 15 minute return series of 
cash and futures indexes we compute the cross correlation coefficients of futures and 
cash returns for 10 lag and lead intervals.  Theoretically24, the contemporaneous rate of 
return of the futures and the stock market should be perfectly, positively correlated with 
the non-contemporaneous returns uncorrelated.  Thus, a  lead-lag relationship should 
not exist.  In addition to cross-correlation returns, we also determine the cross-
correlation of squared returns.  Daigler (1997), has shown that this measure can be used 
as a crude indicator of the volatility link between the two indexes. 
 
 Cross-correlation coefficients however, do not provide information about whether 
the observed relationship reflects a simple cause-effect relationship or other complex 
relationships.  As such, in order to determine the nature of the lead-lag relationship 
between stock and futures returns, regression analysis is used.   
 
Following Abhyankar (1995) and Fortenbery and Zapata (1997), we use the following 
regression equation: 
tc,Γ = a + ∑
=
−=
−
nk
nk
ktfbkr ,   +  tc,∈ ............... (1) 
where tc ,Γ  denotes stock market/cash return at time t, tfr ,  futures return at time t, n 
denotes the number of leads or lags used and  tc,∈  the error term.  Based on our 
earlier tests which showed that cross correlations at longer leads and lags are 
                                               
24Assuming perfect markets and non-stochastic interest rates and dividend yields. 
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insignificant, we restricted the regression to 5 lead and lag intervals.  The regression test 
involves regressing stock market returns on lead, contemporaneous and lagged KLCI 
futures returns25.  The coefficient with negative subscripts is the lead coefficient while a 
positive subscript a lag coefficient.  If the lead coefficients are significant, then cash 
leads the futures and if the lag coefficients are significant than cash lags futures.  Feed 
back exists when both situations prevail.  Standard t-tests are used to determine 
significance. 
 We examine for potential lead-lag relationship in volatility between the two 
markets by revising the above regression equation as:26 
tjtf
nj
nj
tc bjVaV ∈++= −
=
−=
∑ ,, .................... (2) 
Where tcV ,  and tfV ,  are the volatilities of the cash and futures respectively at time ,t  n  
the number of leads and lags and ∈  the error term.  As in the case of returns, we 
examine 5 leads and lags. 
 
SECTION 4:  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 In this section, we provide the results and analysis for our six research questions.  
Recall, that the first four questions were addressed using daily data while the last two 
questions with 15 minute interval transaction data. 
 
4.1:  Impact of Futures Introduction on Underlying Market 
 In analyzing the impact of futures introduction on the underlying stock market, we 
begin with an examination of Figure 1.  Figure 1, plots daily movements in the stock 
                                               
25In this case, b1 represents t - 1, which is the first lag of the difference between contemporaneous cash and 
futures levels, b - 1  represents t + 1, the first lead of the difference. 
26See: Abhyankar (1995) 
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market KLSE index; the 3 month KLIBOR and the cash market volatility measure,  
In ( )1/ −tt CC  for the four year period 1994 to 1997.  The introduction of the Index futures 
contract on KLOFFE in December 1995 is also indicated.  Visual examination of the 
volatility plot appears to show 3 segments.  A first segment of high volatility from early 
1994 to approximately July 1995.  This is followed by segment 2; a period of relatively 
low volatility until about end April 1997.  The final segment, has some of highest 
volatility.   This third segment was the onset of the currency crisis.  As is evident from the 
Figure 1, KLOFFE's opening appears to have had no impact on underlying stock market 
volatility.  It appears that interest movements dictate stock market volatility.  Segment 2, 
which witnessed very stable interest rates saw minimal stock market volatility 
eventhough index futures contracts were introduced early in the segment.  Figures 2 and 
3 which plot the daily volatility measures In ( )1/ −tt CC  and In ( )tt LH /  for the stock 
market tells the same story.  We confirm these casual observations with statistical 
significance tests.  Table 1, shows the effect of futures introduction on stock market 
volatility for several window periods before and after.  Both the 30 and 60 day periods 
show marginally higher volatility post introduction by  both volatility measures.  However, 
none of these are statistically significant, implying no change in volatility in the period 
immediately following introduction.  Extending the window period obviously introduces 
any number confounding effects and would therefore be less reliable.  Still, it is 
interesting to note the results.  The one year period following futures introduction shows 
lower volatility.  This is significant even at the 1% level.  The 2 year window however 
has significantly higher volatility post introduction.  The cause of this apparent 
contradiction is obvious from Figures 1, 2 and 3.  The last 6 month period, from July 
1997 onwards had the highest volatility plots.  This was due to the onset of the currency  
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crisis.  Dropping that six month period and calculating the 1 ½ year window, again shows 
significantly lower volatility post futures introduction.  A result consistent with that of the 
one year window. 
 
 Based on the more reliable 30 and 60 day windows, one can only conclude that 
futures introduction had no meaningful impact on stock market volatility.  Overall, there 
certainly has not been any increase in volatility. 
 
4.2:  Relative Volatility; Futures Vs. Stock Market  
 Results of our volatility comparison between futures and stocks are shown in 
tables 2A, 2B and 2C.  Table 2A shows the same day volatility by month for the stock 
market and the spot month futures contract on a daily basis using the close to close 
volatility measure.  Table 2B, for the In ( )tt LH /  measure.  By the first measure, futures 
volatility is higher for 17 of the 24 month periods.  Of these 4 are significant.  Futures 
volatility is lower for only 7 contract periods, none significantly.  By the second volatility 
measure, (Table 2B), futures volatility is higher for 13 of 24 periods.  Of these, 8 
significantly so.  Futures volatility is lower for 11 month periods  but only 5 are 
significantly lower.  The GKV measure in Table 2C shows similar results.  Futures 
volatility is lower for 9 contracts and significantly for 4.  15 futures contracts however 
have higher volatility.  9 of which are significant. 
 
 For the total period of 2 years or 506 daily observations, futures volatility is 
significantly higher by all three measures.  It appears from these results, that daily 
volatility on the futures market is higher than that of the underlying stock market.   A 
result that is consistent with earlier studies in other countries. 
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4.3:  Expiration Day Effect   
 The  settlement value of  KLCI futures  at expiration is determined as the average 
value of the stock index for the last half hour of  trading (4.30 - 5.00 pm) on expiration 
day,  after excluding the highest and lowest prices.  This settlement value determination 
is quite different for example from that of the Nikkei or FTSE 100. 
 
 The results of our test for whether there is an expiration day effect is shown in 
Figs. 4 and 5 and Table 3.  The figures show the median and the interquartile ranges for 
all non-expiration days.  The distribution of expiration day volatility using the respective  
volatility measures is shown.  In determining whether the expiration day volatility is 
statistically different from that of the sample non-expiration days, we examine 
probabilities.  The probability that the observed expiration day would occur in a sample 
of non-expiration days is determined using the cumulative binomial distribution.  A low 
probability would indicate a significantly different event and thus denote expiration days 
as unusual.  The cumulative probabilities as shown in Table 3 are 15.4% and 72.9% 
respectively for the two volatility measures.  These probabilities are much higher than 
the 5% (or 10%) levels used to establish significance.  We conclude therefore that stock 
market volatility is no different on futures expiration days relative to normal non-
expiration days.  There appears to be  no evidence of an expiration day effect. 
 
4.4: Extent of Mispricing 
 Figure 6, shows the extent of daily mispricing for the overall period.  The 
mispricing shown is exclusive of transaction costs.  The figure shows a number of 
interesting features.  First, there clearly appears to be much more frequent underpricing 
than overpricing.  Second, the percentage and magnitude  of underpricing is larger.  
Overpricing is not only less frequent but appears to be of a lower magnitude.  Third, 
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there appears to be stretches of very little or no overpricing, one example being the 
period June to August 1996.  A final interesting factor is the overall trend.  Unlike 
findings elsewhere, Brenner et al (1989b), Bacha and Fremault (1993), etc; which report 
reduced mispricing over time, Figure 6 seems to show quite the opposite.  Mispricing  is 
clearly higher in the latter periods of the study.  Even if one ignores the period from the 
onset of the currency crisis, there clearly is no declining trend in mispricing over the 1½  
year period preceeding crisis. 
 
 The patterns noted in Figure 6 are confirmed in Tables 4A, B and C.  Table 4A 
shows the summary statistics of daily mispricing by each spot month contract.  19 of the 
24 contracts studied had mean underpricing.  15 of these were significantly so.  Only five 
contracts had mean overpricing, of these three were not significant.  The standard 
deviation of mispricing shows a steady  increase especially for the latter contracts.  Our 
earlier observation from Figure 6 of the much higher frequency of underpricing is borne 
out in Table 4B.  Clearly the proportion of days with underpricing is much higher than 
that of overpricing for all except a few contracts.  Several sequential contracts have very 
few days of overpricing. 
 
 While transaction costs would effect arbitrageable  opportunities  on both sides:-  
i.e., both over and underpricing, the huge preponderance   for underpricing that we have 
thus far observed needs to be explained.  We believe this has partly to do with the 
regulatory framework.  In essence, the regulation is biased against Reverse Cash and 
Carry arbitrage.  While short selling of stocks are  prohibited, there is no rule against 
shorting the futures contracts.  When a futures contract is underpriced, the index 
arbitrage strategy would be to long futures and short the underlying index of stocks.  The 
regulation however prevents this. On the other hand, when futures are overpriced there 
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is no hindrance whatsoever to going short futures and long stocks.  We believe the short 
selling regulation is a major  reason for the preponderance of futures underpricing. 
 
4.5 :  Pattern in Intraday Volatility and Trading Activity 
 Summary statistics of the 15 minute intraday transaction data for KLCI  index 
futures for the 43 sample days is provided in Table 6.  The table shows the mean 
interval measures for the three measures of volatility, volume and number of ticks.  
Volume and number of tick is used as representative of trading activity/intensity.   
Previous studies have shown the existence of U-shaped volatility and volume patterns.  
To check for the existence of such a pattern, we plot the summary statistics of Table 6.  
The results are shown in Figures 7 to 11.  Figures 7, 8, and 9 plot the three volatility 
measures.  With the exception of the In ( )1/ −tt CC  measure,  the other 2 volatility 
measures show an overall U-shape.  Such a shape is also evident for the trading activity 
measures, volume and number of ticks. (Figs. 10, 11) 
 
 Though we find an overall U-shape, one difference found here is the existence of 
a minor third peak.  The two normal peaks; at opening (9.00 - 9.15 am) and a closing 
peak (5.00 - 5.15 pm) are clearly evident.  This is consistent with Brock and Kleidon 
(1992) who propose that volume and volatility would be higher at opening and closing.  
Our findings however are different from that of Daigler (1997) who finds that volatility 
peaks not at the closing interval but approximately 30 minutes earlier.27  Our findings are 
also different in that we find a clear third peak during the 2.30 - 2.45 pm interval.  This is 
when the market reopens for the afternoon trading session following lunch break.  To 
confirm whether the observed peaks at the specific 15 minute intervals are statistically 
                                               
27
 See; Daigler (1997), study using 15 minute interval data for S&P 500 futures. 
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significant we did a pair wise t-test of each interval with its preceeding interval.  The 
results for the three peaks were significantly different from its paired interval. 28  Table 7, 
shows the results for the comparison of select intervals.   
 
 Overall, the KLCI futures market does display U-shaped volatility and trading 
pattern.  The one notable difference in this study is the clear evidence of a third peak 
when the market opens for the afternoon session.  By and large these findings  are 
consistent with the findings of Chan et.al (1991),  Froot et.al (1990) and Cheung and Ng 
(1990) for the S&P 500 futures.  The latter two studies had also used 15 minute interval 
data. 
 
4.6:  Test for Lead-lag Relationship 
 Our examination of possible lead-lag relationship in intraday returns between 
stocks and futures used cross correlations and regression.  The result of the cross 
correlations between the returns of the stock index and futures for the 15 minute 
intervals for 10 lead/lag intervals is shown in Table 8.  The contemporaneous 
relationship between futures prices and the index is quite strong at 0.7062.  However, 
there is no statistical significance.  The coefficients for all 10 of the lead and lagged 
intervals are much smaller.    Table 9 shows the squared cross correlation of the return 
series.  Squared cross correlation serves as a crude indicator of the volatility links 
(Daigler, 1997) between the two markets.  Once again only the contemporaneous 
relationship is high.  It is also the only coefficient that is significant.  These results imply 
a positive contemporaneous relationship in volatility and a slightly weaker one in returns. 
                                               
28The results are not shown for want of space.  The results are available on request from the authors. 
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 The cross correlation results are confirmed by the result of the regression 
equation (1),   Table 10 panel (A).   The contemporaneous coefficient is the highest.  It is 
positive and significant, implying a contemporaneous  relationship in returns.  The lead 
coefficients for 3 intervals are all significant,  however the size of the coefficients are 
small. 
 
 Testing for lead-lag relationship in the volatility of returns using regression 
equation (2) provided results shown in Table 10, Panel (B).  The contemporaneous 
coefficient, though significant is very small.  All the coefficients are small and none of the 
others are significant.  There appears to be no evidence of any systematic relationship 
other than a marginally contemporaneous one in the volatility of returns. 
 
 Based on these results, we can only conclude that there is no evidence of a lead-
lag relationship.  The relationship is largely contemporaneous in nature.  Both markets 
appear to react simultaneously to information arrival. 
 
SECTION 5 :  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 This paper examined several issues related to the introduction and trading of 
stock index futures contracts in Malaysia.  Issues related to volatility,  pricing efficiency, 
systematic patterns and lead-lag relationships were examined.  These issues were 
studied by way of addressing six research questions.    (i)  What is the impact of futures 
introduction on underlying market volatility?  (ii)  How does  futures volatility  compare to 
stock market volatility?  (iii)  Is there any evidence of an expiration day effect?  (iv)  What 
is the extent of mispricing?  (v)  Are there systematic patterns in intraday volatility and 
trading? and (vi)  Do the returns and volatility exhibit any lead-lag relationship?  We use 
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two data sets, daily price data for the 2 year period of futures trading and intraday 15 
minute interval data for a total of 43 days. 
 
 Replicating previously used methodologies to test our data, we find no evidence 
of any increase in the volatility of the underlying stock market index as a result of futures 
introduction.  If anything, the one year period following futures introduction had lower 
volatility.  Comparison of relative volatility between the futures and stock index show 
higher futures market volatility.  Our test for expiration day effect, showed no evidence of 
increased stock market volatility on futures expiration days.  As has been the case in 
other newly introduced markets, we find frequent mispricing.  Most of the deviations 
were in the form of underpricing.  Overpricing was both less frequent and of smaller 
magnitude.  Including transaction costs, we find much less mispricing.  Of the remaining, 
underpricing was still dominant. 
 
 Using intraday 15 minute data, we find clear evidence of an overall U-shaped 
pattern in futures volatility and trading activity.  In addition to peaks at the opening and 
closing intervals, our plots exhibit a minor third peak at market reopening after lunch 
break.  Tests for the presence of a lead-lag relationship showed no evidence of such a 
relationship.  Our results point to a relationship that is largely contemporaneous in 
nature.  Both markets appear to react simultaneously to information arrival. 
 
In conclusion, two points should be kept in mind.  First, by our transaction cost 
estimates, a  round trip cash and carry strategy would cost 2.22% whereas a reverse 
cash and carry strategy 2.32%.  These are obviously high when compared to costs in 
developed markets.  Estimating market impact costs, particularly bid-ask spreads has 
been difficult.  We have also not included the possibility of quasi-arbitrage and 
 30 
 
negotiated commissions which have recently been made possible for certain categories 
of players. 
 
 A second point, is the relative size of the futures market to the underlying stock 
market.  The Ringgit value of trading volume in the futures market relative to stock 
market volume though not insignificant, is still small.  We would estimate it at an average 
20 - 25% of stock market Ringgit volume.   That there was no impact of futures 
introduction on stock market volatility and no evidence of an expiration day effect should 
not be surprising given the perspective of size.  The lack of a lead-lag relationship but a 
largely contemporaneous one and a U-shaped pattern is also consistent.  Chang, Kang 
and Rhee (1993), had established the existence of a U-shaped pattern in the Malaysian 
Stock Market.  It appears from our results that the futures market given its small size 
may merely be following and not dictating trends in the underlying market. 
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Chart 1 
Contract Specification 
 
 
Contract Specifications 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index Futures Contract 
 
Contract Code 
 
FKLI 
Underlying  
Instrument 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite 
Index ("KLSE CI") 
Contract Size KLSE CI Futures multiplied by RM100.00 
Minimum Price 
Fluctuation 
0.1 index point valued at RM10.00 
Daily Price Limits 20% per trading session for the respective contract 
months except the spot month contract.  Matched 
trades which exceed the price limits are not valid. 
Contract Months Spot month, the next month, the next two calendar 
quarterly months.  The calendar quarterly months are 
March, June, September and December. 
Trading Hours First trading session: Malaysian 08.45 hours to 12.45 
hours, Second trading session: Malaysian 14.30 hours 
to 17:15 hours. 
Final Trading Day and 
Maturity Date 
The last Business Day of the contract month. 
Final Settlement Day Prior to the start of Business Day following the Final 
Trading Day 
Final Settlement  Cash Settlement based on the Final Settlement Value 
Final Settlement Value The Final Settlement Value shall be the average value, 
rounded upwards or downwards to one decimal point 
(0.005 being rounded upwards) of the KLSE on the 
Final Trading Day excepting the highest and lowest 
values. 
Margins  Initial Margin: RM6,000 per contract Spot Month Spread 
Margin:  RM1,500 Back Month Spread Margin:  
RM1,250. 
Source:  KLOFFE Handbook On Business Rules. 
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Table 6 : Summary Statistics Of Volatility And Trading Activity Measures. 
Volatility Measures Trading Activity Measures. 
Number  
Time 
In(Ct/C t-
1) In(Ht/Lt) GKV. of ticks Volume 
09:00 - 09:15 0.0112 0.0058 50.6429 172.9048 
09:15 - 09:30 0.0061 0.0083 0.0033 42.0000 92.6905 
09:30 - 09:45 0.0048 0.0060 0.0018 34.2093 87.5814 
09:45 - 10:00 0.0051 0.0052 0.0014 29.6744 75.8605 
10:00 - 10:15 0.0032 0.0046 0.0010 28.7907 61.3256 
10:15 - 10:30 0.0033 0.0041 0.0009 24.8095 72.2381 
10:30 - 10:45 0.0042 0.0045 0.0009 24.1429 55.2143 
10:45 - 11:00 0.0041 0.0046 0.0011 23.8049 68.1463 
11:00 - 11:15 0.0033 0.0039 0.0007 20.5476 43.9286 
11:15 - 11:30 0.0026 0.0040 0.0007 22.3095 73.1429 
11:30 - 11:45 0.0030 0.0040 0.0007 20.9268 73.0976 
11:45 - 12:00 0.0036 0.0039 0.0007 21.8095 50.3571 
12:00 - 12:15 0.0031 0.0039 0.0007 23.7857 56.3333 
12:15 - 12:30 0.0049 0.0044 0.0008 19.2857 54.1905 
12:30 - 12:45 0.0023 0.0027 0.0003 15.2857 33.4762 
14:30 - 14:45 0.0060 0.0061 0.0017 34.5250 80.6000 
14:45 - 15:00 0.0049 0.0051 0.0012 27.8049 61.3171 
15:00 - 15:15 0.0036 0.0047 0.0010 25.5750 66.0250 
15:15 - 15:30 0.0041 0.0050 0.0012 27.4615 61.1538 
15:30 - 15:45 0.0053 0.0051 0.0012 25.0732 66.9762 
15:45 - 16:00 0.0045 0.0049 0.0012 27.8333 57.6190 
16:00 - 16:15 0.0054 0.0050 0.0012 26.7619 64.4286 
16:15 - 16:30 0.0033 0.0043 0.0009 26.7674 66.0465 
16:30 - 16:45 0.0032 0.0042 0.0009 28.1395 61.7674 
16:45 - 17:00 0.0039 0.0047 0.0011 32.8837 84.0698 
17:00 - 17:15 0.0047 0.0063 0.0020 55.3721 149.0698 
This table reports the of the volatility and trading activity measures for KLCI Futures. 
Summarizes the 15 minute interval data across all 43 days. 
GKV, refers to Garman-Klass Volatility. 
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Table 7 : Test Of Significance For Select 15 Minute Intervals 
Volatility : In (Ct/Ct-1) 
       Intervals Compared 
 t 
statistics   p ratio   significant   
09:00 - 
09:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 4.0427 0.0015  **  
09:00 - 
09:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 0.5944 0.2834 
09:00 - 
09:15 
17:00 - 
17:15 2.3590 0.0213  *  
    
17:00 - 
17:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 3.2334 0.0052  **  
17:00 - 
17:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 -1.3487 0.1052 
    
16:15 - 
16:30 
16:45 - 
17:00 -1.4534 0.0900 
16:15 - 
16:30 
17:00 - 
17:15 -0.7190 0.2452 
    
Volatility : In (Ht/Lt) 
       Intervals Compared 
 t 
statistics   p ratio   significant   
09:00 - 
09:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 11.8572 0.0000  **  
09:00 - 
09:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 4.9208 0.0004  **  
09:00 - 
09:15 
17:00 - 
17:15 5.1542 0.0003  **  
    
17:00 - 
17:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 6.2375 0.0001  **  
17:00 - 
17:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 0.1815 0.4300 
    
16:15 - 
16:30 
16:45 - 
17:00 -0.9192 0.1910 
16:15 - 
16:30 
17:00 - 
17:15 -2.8394 0.0097  **  
    
    
Trading Activity: Number Of Ticks 
       Intervals Compared 
 t 
statistics   p ratio   significant   
09:00 - 
09:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 6.5248 0.0001  **  
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09:00 - 
09:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 2.5509 0.0157  *  
09:00 - 
09:15 
17:00 - 
17:15 -1.3094 0.1114 
    
17:00 - 
17:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 8.6796 0.0000  **  
17:00 - 
17:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 3.3445 0.0043  **  
    
16:15 - 
16:30 
16:45 - 
17:00 -2.5122 0.0166  *  
16:15 - 
16:30 
17:00 - 
17:15 -7.9931 0.0000  **  
    
    
Trading Activity: Volume 
       Intervals Compared 
 t 
statistics   p ratio   significant   
09:00 - 
09:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 4.0804 0.0014  **  
09:00 - 
09:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 2.7754 0.0108  *  
09:00 - 
09:15 
17:00 - 
17:15 3.5454 0.0031  **  
    
17:00 - 
17:15 
12:30 - 
12:45 4.0333 0.0015  **  
17:00 - 
17:15 
14:30 - 
14:45 2.5259 0.0162  *  
    
16:15 - 
16:30 
16:45 - 
17:00 -2.2879 0.0240  *  
16:15 - 
16:30 
17:00 - 
17:15 -4.4374 0.0008  **  
    
The above tables highlight the statistical significance tests for the volatility 
and volume measures.The selection of intervals is to confirm the significance 
of the opening, closing and re-opening peaks. 
I) opening interval with mid day, re-opening and closing interval. 
ii) closing interval with mid day and re-opening interval 
iii) 4.15 -4.30 interval with last two 15 minute intervals. 
Note : *  sign.at 5% level, ** sign. at 1%. 
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 Table 8: Cross-Correlations ;KLCI Index and Futures Returns.   
 coefficient  
 t 
statistics  
 p 
value   significant  
 Cash Leads  
         10  
 
0.0277
 
-0.0063 0.4975 
           9  -0.0172 -0.0081 0.4968 
           8  0.0061 -0.0067 0.4973 
           7  -0.0015 0.0152 0.4939 
           6  0.0668 0.0226 0.4910 
           5  0.0565 0.0175 0.4930 
           4  0.0142 0.0247 0.4901 
           3  0.0402 -0.0052 0.4979 
           2  0.0102 -0.0134 0.4947 
           1  0.1106 -0.0136 0.4946 
 O  0.7062 -0.0078 0.4969 
 Cash 
Lags  
          (1) -0.0963 -0.0122 0.4951 
          (2) -0.0094 -0.0053 0.4979 
          (3) -0.0018 -0.0137 0.4945 
          (4) 0.0188 -0.0238 0.4905 
          (5) 0.0469 -0.0508 0.4798 
          (6) 0.0497 -0.0425 0.4831 
          (7) 0.0223 -0.0497 0.4802 
          (8) -0.0135 -0.0513 0.4795 
          (9) 0.0119 -0.0563 0.4775 
        (10) 0.0039 -0.0552 0.4780 
Note : * denotes sign.at 5% level; ** sign. at 1% 
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 Table 9: Squared Cross-Correlations; KLCI Index And Futures Returns.   
 coefficient  
 t 
statistics  
 p 
value   significant  
 Cash leads  
         10  
 
-0.0091
 
-1.4290 0.0767 
           9  -0.0077 -1.4297 0.0765 
           8  0.0152 -1.4441 0.0745 
           7  -0.0048 -1.4282 0.0768 
           6  -0.0006 1.4305 0.0764 
           5  0.0115 -1.4377 0.0754 
           4  0.0056 -1.4344 0.0759 
           3  0.0075 -1.4386 0.0753 
           2  -0.0055 -1.4300 0.0765 
           1  0.0010 -1.4341 0.0759 
 O  0.7062 -2.6025 0.0047  *  
 Cash 
lags  
          (1) 0.0078 -1.4376 0.0754 
          (2) 0.0022 -1.4350 0.0758 
          (3) 0.0063 -1.4362 0.0756 
          (4) -0.0079 -1.4273 0.0769 
          (5) -0.0031 -1.4277 0.0768 
          (6) -0.0057 -1.4266 0.0770 
          (7) -0.0024 -1.4291 0.0766 
          (8) -0.0066 -1.4265 0.0770 
          (9) -0.0068 -1.4266 0.0770 
        (10) -0.0011 -1.4301 0.0765 
Note : * denotes sign.at 5% level; ** sign. at 1% 
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Table 10:  Results Of Linear Regression ; 15 Minute Intervals 
Panel A: Index Returns with Lead -lags of Futures Returns. (Eq. 1) 
 X-
coefficient  
 t 
statistics  
 p 
value   significant  
 b - 5  0.0053 0.3169 0.7514 
 b - 4  -0.0093 -0.5495 0.5828 
 b - 3  -0.0107 -0.6298 0.5290 
 b - 2  -0.0020 -0.1159 0.9078 
 b -1  -0.0103 -0.6068 0.5441 
 b 0  0.5926 35.0298 0.0000  **  
 b 1  0.1652 9.7520 0.0000  **  
 b 2  0.0449 2.6537 0.0081  **  
 b 3  0.0431 2.5475 0.0110  *  
 b 4  0.0047 0.2775 0.7814 
 b 5  0.0207 1.2312 0.2185 
Panel B: Volatility of Index Returns with Lead -lags of Futures Return Volatility. (Eq. 2) 
 X-
coefficient  
 t 
statistics  
 p 
value   significant  
 b - 5  -0.0024 -0.1338 0.8936 
 b - 4  0.0118 0.6263 0.5312 
 b - 3  0.0101 0.5329 0.5941 
 b - 2  0.0082 0.4248 0.6711 
 b -1  -0.0017 -0.0910 0.9275 
 b 0  -0.0705 3.6739 0.0002 
 b 1  -0.0010 -0.0524 0.9582 
 b 2  -0.0035 -0.0178 0.8582 
 b 3  0.0050 0.2594 0.7953 
 b 4  -0.0008 -0.0432 0.9656 
 b 5  -0.0066 -0.3501 0.7263 
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Note : * denotes sign.at 5% level; ** sign. at 1% 
The coefficients with negative and positive subscripts are the lead and lagged  
coeficients, respectively. If the lead coefficients are significant, the cash index leads 
the futures index and vice versa. Feedback exists when both the situations prevail,   
that is returns of cash and futures indexes lead or lag each other. 
 
 
 
